African Unification Front


Navy Sailors in the African Union

The AUF seeks the creation, for the purpose of a common defense, of an African army linked to the institutions of the Africa Union. There must be a complete amalgamation of soldiers and equipment under a single military authority. Initially the amalgamation must be at subdivisional level, and each division is to consist of combat teams from various regions.

Currently the official government-run militaries consist of over 1,500,000 soldiers in the army, navy and air forces. When added to dissident militias and guerrilla forces, government para-militaries, mercenary forces, independent yet heavily armed civil groups, and foreign troops on African soil, the number of armed forces increases substantially to an estimated 3.5 million.

In order to secure peace in the African Union, rules must be put in place in order to prevent military coups and warfare. At the constituent state and province level, these rules are as follows:

[1] No state may buy weapons, nor have an army, nor have a general staff. Only the African Chiefs of Defense Staff of the African Union may function as a general staff.

[2]No state may manufacture weapons without the express authorization of the African Union Commission and the Pan African Parliament.

[3]All military hardware, bases, and information belong to the African Union Government.

[4]No state may deploy or withdraw an army unit of any size for any reason whatsoever. Only the African Union government is authorized to deploy army units.

[5]In a state of emergency the General Staff may only take those actions mandated by the AUF Guidelines for Military Interposition. The government may only withdraw or deploy units according to the guidelines. See Military Law     

[6]No state may allocate a budget for military spending. Only the Pan African Parliament may allocate a budget for military spending for the African Union.

[7]No state may have a complete complement of war industries.

[8]No state may conscript or train troops other than those supplied for continental defense by the Pan African Parliament of the African Union.

[9]No army units are allowed inside the capital cities unless the cities are under threat of military occupation by a hostile FOREIGN power, or in the course of assisting the public in event of an environmental or humanitarian disaster (operations other than war).

Restructuring must provide the integrated, more responsive, agile, strategically deployable and sustainable Pan African army.

It is imperative to prevent the unnecessary duplication of efforts or misuse of resources engendered by the continuing existence of over 100 statutory armed forces and services in the African Union.

Most constituent states of the AU have up to three armed forces under independent Chains of Command, including the regular army, the presidential guard, and an assortment of special forces, as well as a multiplicity of intelligence groups, paramilitaries, and militias (not counting dissident and non statutory armies).

There is an urgent need to coordinate these forces, and utilize a single highly trained All African army with services and formations that operate in all regions as needed.

Integrating the forces will allow for more effective operational plans, economy of operation, and prevent duplication of facilities and resources.

Analysis of the linkages among missions, operations, and tasks will enable the identification of the essentials needed to successfully design and implement improvements to training systems.

Materiel and equipment acquisitions should be driven by a requirements-based analysis of mission-operation-task key performance parameters.

Pan African Diplomacy must become the main policy of government in Africa, when dealing with international security threats. The neocolonial methods of world diplomacy and the corrosive legacy of colonial occupation and colonial warfare preclude productive relations between Africans and the rest of the world. Unconventional military hostility towards Africans is continuing to kill and maim millions of Africans. NATO and the former communist Bloc devised, in the mid-20th century, extremely aggressive methods of military threat, subversion, and intervention in Africa.

Light Infantry Troops

The use of mercenaries, "advisors", expatriates, intelligence operatives, corporate sponsored terror, and proxy neocolonial armies became wide spread. The central purpose of all this conflict is to secure foreign access to African strategic resources such as uranium, cobalt, industrial diamonds, and military bases.

Pan Africanists must recognize these methods of intervention as constituting a real military offensive. The military strategy of the AUF is to devise appropriate counter-measures and methods to end neocolonial aggression. Reorientation and the redefinition of roles, retraining and reeducation have to be done to ensure that the African military submits to civil authority and regains its pride, professionalism and traditions.

In terms of training, the African soldier must have a thorough knowledge of the environment and background to the conflict prior to deployment to the mission area. The importance of training the military in human rights must be emphasised. International Humanitarian Law must be built into all training programmes at all levels.

African soldiers must also consider that foreign military organizations such as NATO, the Russian Army, as well as former colonial European powers, pose a military threat, in their continuing use of "dumping", as a means of getting rid of obsolete military hardware, and in their utilization of mercenary forces, weapons dealers, and intelligence forces. The lack of Policy Coherence in the African policy directives of EU member states and the USA, is extremely frustrating, and results in death, displacement and impoverishment of Africans.

The aim of any African defense system must be to achieve independence with regard to foreign forces in terms of materials and military ethos. Because of huge military expenditures over the last 30 years, Africa has accumulated a massive arsenal of obsolete hardware, and questionable yet fragmented military policies that pose the gravest threat to the security of the Africans primarily, and only secondarily to potential foreign enemies.

In otherwords, while Africans build armies to fight neocolonial wars against fellow Africans, basing tactics and strategies on classical models of the European and America theatres of war, and basing on non-African needs, we have created alien military systems incapable of supporting order in Africa. While African armed forces need to gain efficiencies in international standards of defence, they also need to pay more attention to home-grown efficiencies that are based on actually protecting African lives and augmenting the security of African communities.

Being aware of a divided Africa's structural weakness - it is imperative to organize the nucleus of a future African army to defend Africa's independence and unity. Past attempts to unify African armies were derailed by neocolonial interventions. Interventions by NATO such as the failed South Atlantic Treaty Organization, and a Pre-independence African Military College to indoctrinate African military officers in pro-European military interests. The inevitability of African unification was understood by the neocolonial forces, who then tried to intervene in the formation of a united African army by sponsoring its future formulation.

Self-serving interventions of this nature pose a real threat to Africans. The contest for the final form and functions of an All-African army is already in high gear. So far all major joint force excercises in Africa are done under the auspices of UN peace-keeping, or under foreign sponsorship of NATO, Russia, France, or Britain. The African Crisis Response Initative ACRI, was designed under the sponsorship of the USA, however it needs serious structural modifications and drastic ideological reorientation if it is to serve a useful purpose in Africa. Moreover, in the end it would benefit Africans greatly to master the means of undermining neocolonial designs by drastically retooling all military institutions with a more basic unification ideology and functionality.

In 1988 the OAU assembly set in place the legislative structure under which the African Defense Forces would come into being. The simple and direct amalgamation of current African armies requires a complex set of reforms, basing on what we have learned from the function of African forces under the Joint Military Commission of the OAU, ECOMOG, SANDF, UN Peace-keeping missions, ACRI, and the joint operations of African guerillas and dissident armies, as well as the operations of the African states' forces in the Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, SierraLeone, Angola, Sudan, and Rwanda, Uganda, Morocco, Liberia, other theatres of African war.

Because membership is representative of Africans in all classes, and professions, many AUF members also belong to military and paramilitary organisations in different regions of Africa. All AUF members and supporters who are military or paramilitary personnel have been instructed not to participate in any actions that would require them to abuse or to kill other Africans in areas of military or political conflict. They are required by the AUF to maintain a higher standard of discipline and tolerance, and to safeguard at all times, the lives of all Africans and the stability of vulnerable African communities.

Some of the AUF members serve as assessors and provide valuable information about conditions in war-zones and displacement camps. For instance, in the Congo conflict, the AUF has supporters within the armies of Uganda, Rwanda, Congo, Angola and the 'rebel' movements. Many of these soldiers believe in unity and those who support the AUF see the futility of war against their African brothers and sisters. The AUF work includes pressuring personnel involved in war, to cease hostilities and to lessen military tensions. The AUF has condemned violence in the Congo, Eritrean-Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Algeria, and other theatres of African conflict.

The AUF will harmonise the interpretation and understanding of the provisions of procurement arrangements, and their implementation. Although, the unified African army (African Defense Force) will be permitted the duty and tax free purchase of materials. The modalities of how this is to transpire will be regulated by the government of unity under the guidance of the African Parliament.

The magnitude of the administration required by the unified Ministry of Defense to affect this exemption will be burdensome, and until the entire taxing regime of Africa is overhauled, may require a complex bureaucracy.

A method to preclude this additional expense or administration would be to purchase goods and services through a single department that deals with specified civilian contractors and corporations. It is prudent for the ADF planners to verify administrative, logistical and financial functions that the new force has no experience does not normally or routinely handle.     
In the conduct of a combined exercise, with the opportunity to for military personnel and staff with different training background and even languages, one must be prepared to accommodate the differences in each other's work habits, customs and definition of various military specialities. One must also understand the view towards the exercise or project held by the other soldiers. The planners and military liaison office should thoroughly coordinate these matters before the soldiers are deployed. However, soldiers working alongside one another on a common project will rapidly create a bond faster and more lasting than any staff officer can coordinate.     
The small unit commander or staff officer must work with the local civil authorities when participating in military exercises. This person must raise civil-military relations to a far higher level of interest and daily concern than during a comparable training exercise at a military facility. All planning of military operations must include civil participation that can be coordinated by a culturally sensitive Public Affairs Officer. His/her assignement will be to inform the public about the ADF equipment and why it is there and is to liaise with community leaders and activists (who must have access to ADF opeartions planning sessions).

The senior civil/community authorities in the exercise area are to always be informed of all planned activities and their support and suggestions must be solicited. Relations with the local populace and authorities must be addressed from the beginning of the planning process and enhanced via the initiative of unit leadership and individuals. The material and financial benefit to the community must be made clear and the help of the civil leadership must be asked in gaining the support of the locals. The objective is to avoid misunderstandings between civilians and the military that can result in fear and hostility.

African military still strongly clings to the tenets of civilian control, guidance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Office of the President is required prior to engaging in any agreements for activities with a foreign military.

Most armies in Africa are relatively small and are involved only in domestic conflicts. They have little capability of exerting military influence outside their respective borders. The worthiness for combat and deterrence in the field remain untested for the most part, and few have any international combat experience.

Although in theory armies can conscript by force, and in Africa they do that, however, for the majority of troops military service is by voluntary enlistment. The average length of service in Africa is approximately 10 years.

The ideal scenario at present would require planners to anticipate and be prepared for confusion and prepare to defeat it by effective coordination and insisting on frequent senior level contact.

Any future military leaders in Africa must become familiar with the Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) of intra-theater movements and convoy operations in Africa. At present only mercenaries and journalists are equiped with extensive enough knowledge about the totallity of combat conditions across Africa.

Furthermore, foreign troops, including US military personnel MUST NOT BE ALLOWED to drive military equipment on African territory [even during humanitarian relief opeartions missions]. Any government authority that approves such an excercise is in violation of AUF security protocols, and jeopardises the future security of African lives.

All foreign military husbanding contracts in place at many ports around Africa, including Mombasa, must cease. These contracts include off-loading of ships and inland transport of the cargo. The AUF will revoke these contracts. No foreign military ships may off-load military equipment of any kinds whatsoever at any African port of entry without the consent of a Government of Africa Unification or the Pan African Parliament, or the authorization of the unified command of African armed forces.

Repeatedly joint missions under ECOMOG, SADC, or during joint guerilla operations African officers have proven their ability, authority and responsibility in a shared endeavor that involve units from different countries. Also African soldiers understand and able to follow the "unity of command" principle of war.

The Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Libya, Morroco, South Africa and Uganda have the largest armies in Africa. Most African armies are smaller. The Kenyan army approximates the avarage African army. It forces employ about 24,500 men and women.

Under the African Union, amalgamation of armies will result in an army of just under 1,000,000 troops. These troops will be under a single command, a situation that will make it easier to lower substantially the level of conflict on the well, the reduction in the overall size of troops of Africa's current armed forces (numbering approximately 100 armies, militias, and dissident armies), will help to cut Afrivcan military spending by more than 50%. The savings amount to over US $2 billion annually.

African armies (both statutory and non-statutory) have high capacities for (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield). IPB in a unified Africa is applicable as a concept for use if one focuses on the mission and re-defines the nature of the "enemy". The "enemy" must cease to be other Africans, and must include humanitarian and environmental failure. The early dispatch of logisticians (supply, maintenance and transport), contracting officers, medical personnel and civil affairs experts is invaluable to restoring order in distressed communities.

Under the current fragmentary military regime in the African Union, armies train primarily for offense and suppression of localised insurgency (enforcement of executive orders). Armies train on the basis of attack and counter attack against other Africans. Such hostile exercises are ideologically misguided and are absolutely unacceptable.



 Today's Date: January 22, 2022
 On the Policy Front
 ·  Mbeki Should Reconsider Decision to Relocate African Parliament
 ·  The History of Parliament in Ancient Africa
 ·  The Architecture of Peace and Security in the African Union
 ·  "Lift Every Voice" is the Best Anthem for the African Union
 ·  Sheba is the Right Name for Single African Currency
 ·  AU-EU Relations: Neocolonialism is 50 Years Old
 ·  AUF Wants Moratorium on Weapons Trade in the African Union



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